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Specific and ad-valorem tariffs
Efficiency
Monopolistic competition
a b s t r a c t
The relative efficiency of ad-valorem and specific tariffs is still an active debate in the international
trade literature. Contrary to the general belief about the ad-valorem tariff being superior under various
imperfectly competitive market settings, it is shown that the specific tariff generates more welfare under
monopolistic competition. We argue that this result is not general. If we follow the empirical evidence
that firms use variable mark-ups and use a utility function that allows for it, we find that the ad-valorem
tariff is more efficient when consumers’ love for variety is low. The relative efficiency overturns to the
specific tariff as consumers’ love for variety increases.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Although tariffs can be imposed in a number of ways, the most
common are ad-valorem and specific. There is a long debate in the
trade literature on the relative efficiency of these tariff regimes. In
a perfectly competitive market, for every specific tariff rate there
exists an equivalent ad-valorem tariff level. However, in an im-
perfectly competitive environment this equivalence result breaks
down; an ad-valorem tariff generates higher welfare than a spe-
cific tariff. This has been proven for different tariff equivalence def-
initions such as revenue or import equivalence.1 Jørgensen and
Schröder (2005) showed that in contrast to the general belief, a
specific tariff generates higherwelfare in a symmetric two-country
setting with homogenous firms competing monopolistically and
consumers who have constant elasticity of substitution (CES) util-
ity functions. This reverses the findings of previouswork that stud-
ies tariff policy in an imperfectly competitivemarket setting.When
the ad-valorem tariff is imposed, profit-maximizing firms increase
their output. Higher output reduces prices, decreasing the wedge
between the price consumers pay and the price producers receive.
Consumers are therefore better off with the increased output and
lower prices of ad-valorem tariffs versus specific tariffs. In contrast,
under a specific tariff regime, lower output levels are sufficient to
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1 See Helpman and Krugman (1989) for the non-equivalence of these tariff
regimes under imperfectly competitive market structures.
offset the fixed entry costs. Thus,more firms (varieties) can survive.
Jørgensen and Schröder (2005) argue that higher variety generated
under the specific tariff dominates the lower prices generated un-
der the ad-valorem tariff regime for all parameter values. However,
we argue that the variety effect should deteriorate as love for va-
riety decreases and the ad-valorem tariff should dominate again.
We further argue that their parameter independent result is due
to the CES utility specification where price is a constant multiple
of the marginal cost of production. If we replace the utility specifi-
cation with the one that allows for endogenous markup, we show
that their result is not general. For certain parameter values, the
ad-valorem tariff is a more efficient regime than an import equiv-
alent specific tariff when consumers’ love for variety is low.
Taxation and tariff policy is not a policy tool used only in inter-
national trade settings. There is a substantial public economics lit-
erature comparing the market outcomes and welfare implications
of ad-valorem and specific tax policies. This literature’s conclusion
regarding the welfare ranking of the ad-valorem and specific taxes
are in line with the international trade literature.2 The discussion
made in this paper can be easily extended to the public economics
literature as well.
2. Model description and analysis
The model is based on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). As
mentioned earlier, the quadratic utility function allows for
2 See Keen (1998) for a review of the literature.
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endogenous mark-ups since it permits firms to respond to
competition by varying their mark-ups. With the CES utility
function, firms have constant mark-ups and pricing policy is not
affected by the competitiveness of the market.3
There are L identical consumers in each country. Their
preferences are defined over a continuum of differentiated
products that can be either domestic or foreign, and a numeraire
good. They choose differentiated products that are indexed by i
from the set of home,H and foreign, F varieties,H∪F . A numeraire
good is indexed by 0. Then, a consumer j’s utility function is:



















where qj0 is the numeraire good consumption and q
j
i is the
differentiated good consumption of variety i.4 A consumer’s
inverse demand for each variety is given as pi = α − γ qji − ηQ j,
where Q j is the total quantity consumed by consumer j.
In each country these L consumers who are endowed with
one unit of labor inelastically supply it. There is no leisure in
the utility function. Furthermore, labor is the only factor of
production. The numeraire good is produced under constant
returns to scale at the cost of a unit of labor. Demand for
numeraire good in both countries is ensured to be positivewith the
assumption that income is high enough and it is freely traded in a
perfectly competitive market. If the price of the numeraire good
is normalized to one and since workers receive their revenue of
marginal product, the wage is unity. Moreover, wages are identical
across countries.
All firms producing differentiated products have the same
technology. They pay a one-time fixed cost fe to enter the
differentiated good sector. Each good is produced at a constant
marginal cost of c (equal to c unit labor requirements). There is no
one-time fixed cost to enter the foreign market; exporting firms
only pay the tariff. All firms have the same technology and face
the same problems. Therefore, if it is profitable for one home firm
to export, it is profitable for all home firms to export. Countries
are symmetric in terms of consumers, firms, and tariff restrictions.
Therefore the number of firms in the foreign country and the
home country is equal in equilibrium, i.e. NH = NF = N . The
total number of varieties available is twice the number of varieties
produced at home.
Firms maximize their profits by taking the total number of
varieties and average price in the market as given. Since firms are
homogenous and countries are symmetric, the profit maximizing
prices of home and foreign firms’ products in their own domestic
markets are equal at qdi = qd for every i in both countries. The
profit-maximizing price pd and the output level of a home firm
qd satisfy qd = L
γ
(pd − c) where d denotes the domestic market
variables.
First, we analyze themarket if the government restricts imports
using an ad-valorem tariff. The government collects a fraction t of
the price per unit of an imported good. Following the symmetry
assumptions, all home firms and foreign firms set the same prices
for their exported goods in equilibrium i.e. qxi = qx for every i. Ad-
ditionally, markets are assumed to be segmented; firms therefore
maximize the profit earned in both markets separately. From the
first order condition of the firm’smaximization problem,we obtain
the price of the exported good in the destinedmarket pxt and quan-
3 See Feenstra (2003) for an extensive comparison between CES utility functions
and utility functions that allow endogenous mark-ups.
4 For a detailed discussion of this quadratic utility function and the model, see
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).







denotes the export market variables, and subscript t denotes the
ad-valorem tariff variables. Firms enter the market until the ex-
post profit of a firm Πt(c) is driven to zero; this is the free entry
condition.
Suppose that exporting firms now face a specific tariff. Firms
must pay s for each unit exported. The profit-maximizing price in








pxs − (c + s)

where x denotes export variables, and s denotes
specific tariff variables.
The two tariff regimes are compared with the assumption that
they create the same level of imports, Q . We further compare
the number of varieties, the levels of output produced in both
domestic and foreign markets (size of the firms), and the welfare
implications of different import restriction implementations.
Lemma 1. For a given specific tariff s and an import equivalent ad-
valorem tariff t ,
1. The domestic and foreign output levels of firms under a specific






2. The total varieties available under a specific tariff are higher than
under an ad-valorem tariff: Ns > Nt .
Proof. In the Appendix. 
Briefly, a specific tariff creates smaller firms compared to an
ad-valorem tariff. Firms facing ad-valorem tariff restrictions in
the export market increase their output and decrease their price.
Firms therefore decrease the wedge between the price consumers
pay and the price producers receive. This is a result of an ad-
valorem tariff decreasing the marginal revenue. On the other
hand, a specific tariff acts as an increase in marginal cost. Firms
therefore tend to decrease their output while they increase their
prices. Hence, with higher operating surplus, smaller outputs are
sufficient to offset the fixed entry costs to enter the market. This
allows more firms to exist in the market under a specific tariff.
The results for firm size and number of varieties are in line
with Jørgensen and Schröder (2005). However, this paper departs
from theirs when we compare the welfare implications of the two
tariff regimes. For low levels of love for variety we reestablish the
non-competitive welfare ranking results that an ad-valorem tariff
generates higher welfare than an import-equivalent specific tariff.
We demonstrate this result below using a numerical analysis.5
Fig. 1 shows the welfare ranking of an ad-valorem tariff and
a specific tariff. It is created as follows: take particular values for
the demand parameters α, γ , and η, specific tariff rate s, and the
cost parameters fe and c.6 Using the free-entry condition, the first-
order condition of profit maximization in the domestic market, the
first-order condition of profit maximization in the export market,
and the inverse demand function we find qxs , q
d
s and the number of
home varieties in the market, Ns. The total import is qxsNs. The ad-
valorem tariff rate t is set so that the import level is same under
both tariff regimes. Using the above identical conditions for the
ad-valorem tariff, we find qxt , q
d
t , the number of home varieties
5 Themodel proposedbyMelitz andOttaviano (2008) is simple enough to analyze
and finds closed-form solutions not only for the identical firm case, but also for the
heterogeneous firm case. However, the comparison in this model requires finding
import equivalent ad-valorem and specific tariffs. In order to find closed form
solutions, one must solve Ntqxt = Nsqxs and solve for t , given s or vice versa. The
terms on both sides of the equation are quadratic functions in t and s respectively.
The closed form solutions therefore require tedious algebra, and the results are
presented using numerical analysis.
6 The values chosen for the parameters are as follows: c = 0.01 fe = 1000, α
ranges from 4 to 20, γ ranges from 0.001 to 0.1, η is 100, and s is taken as 0.5.
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Fig. 1. Welfare comparison of ad-valorem and specific tariffs.
in the market Nt , and the import equivalent ad-valorem tariff
rate t . The parameters are chosen such that the problem is well
defined i.e., the demand for a numeraire good is positive. The
figure shows us that there exist sets of parameters for which the
superiority of a specific tariff shifts to an ad-valorem tariff. This
gives a counterexample for the general result of Jørgensen and
Schröder’s (2005) specific tariff dominance.
3. Discussion
There are two effects at work when a tariff is imposed. First, it
affects number of varieties by affecting firms’ price–cost margin.
Second, it increases total income by raising tariff revenue. For low
levels of love for variety, consumers value total consumptionmore
than consuming variety. An ad-valorem tariff therefore generates
more welfare, first by generating more tariff revenue and more
income, and second by keeping the number of firms close to
an efficient level. However, as love for variety increases creating
less variety or inducing excessive firm exit decreases welfare. We
therefore observe the specific tariff being more efficient. Similarly,
Anderson et al. (2001) argued that the relative efficiency of the
two tax forms depends on the government’s revenue requirements
and the strength of tastes for variety relative to entry costs. They
discussed models with completely inelastic aggregate demand to
provide counterexamples to the superiority of the ad-valorem
tariff. This paper uses a utility specification that has sufficiently
elastic demand schedule, and enables us to show the superiority
of the specific tariff for a range of parameters.
This paper departs from Jørgensen and Schröder (2005) by
modeling consumer demand using a utility function that allows
for endogenous mark-up.7 As a result, as the love for variety
parameter changes the firms can not only adjust their output, but
also adjust their price by changing their mark-up. Hence, the total
number of firms in the market changes by both the change in
love for variety and the variable mark-up. On the other hand, the
CES utility function is more restrictive than a utility function that
allows endogenous mark-up. Under a constant mark-up, the price
is already determined as a constant multiple of firms’ marginal
7 Ottaviano et al. (2002) showed the existence of reciprocal dumping with
differentiated products under monopolistic competition with representative firms.
Martin (2010) found that firms perform reverse-dumping for distant countries. He
argues that one of the explanations is the variablemark-up pricing and formof tariff
regimes. Furthermore, Greenhut and Norman (1986) argued that imposing trade
restriction in the form of an ad-valorem tariff rather than a specific tariff will result
in reverse dumping. However, in this paper, we observe dumping (tariff absorption)
under both regimes. pds − (pxs − s) and pdt − (1− t)pxt are both greater than zero.
cost. Firms can respond to changes in competitive environment by
adjusting only their outputs. The number of firms therefore doesn’t
adjust much compared to the endogenous mark-up utility model
when they face competition. Hence, the superiority of the specific
tariff holds for all parameter values due to higher variety.
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Appendix
When firms decide on their output levels, in both the domestic
and foreign markets, they optimize the level of production given
the residual demand in each market. We also argued that the two
markets are segmented, and the optimal level of output in the
domestic market is therefore not a function of the foreign market
variables. However, the total profit level in both markets must
cover the fixed entry costs. The free entry condition describes how
the domestic market output level and foreign market output level
are related. In addition, using the pricing and inverse demand rules
one can describe the difference between the domestic and foreign
output levels. The equations for these two import restrictions are
described below,
The free entry condition for an ad-valorem tariff is simplified
to:
qdt
2 + (1− t) qxt 2 = fe Lγ , (A.1)
the difference between the quantity produced in the domestic and
foreign market is:




1− t c, (A.2)
the free entry condition for a specific tariff is simplified to:
qds
2 + qxs2 = fe Lγ , (A.3)
and the difference between the quantities produced is:




Proof of Lemma 1. Assume an ad-valorem tariff rate tL such that
tL generates the same level of domestic output as the specific tariff
rate s, i.e. qds = qdtL . From simplified free entry conditions (A.1)
and (A.3), we find qxtL > q
x
s . When we calculate the aggregate




s . The import level under an ad-valorem tariff rate of tL






qxtL . The difference between the two
import levels under both regimes is:
Q s − Q tL =
L(α − c)− 2γ qds
η(qds + qxs)
qxs −
L(α − c)− 2γ qdtL
η(qdtL + qxtL)
qxtL ,
























Therefore Q s < Q tL , meaning that tL is not restrictive enough
to generate equal import levels for a given s. In order to decrease
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imports under an ad-valorem tariff, we must increase the import
restriction. The import equivalent t must be less than tL, and
therefore qdt > q
d
tL = qds .
Assume an ad-valorem tariff rate tH that creates the same level
of foreign output for a firm as the specific tariff rate s, i.e. qxtH = qxs .
From simplified free entry conditions (A.1) and (A.3), we know that
qds < q
d
tH . If we calculate the difference between total imports
generated by import restriction levels s and tH , we get:
Q s − Q tH =





L(α − c)− 2γ qdtH
qdtH + qxtH
 qxtH ,


























There are more imports under the specific tariff than under the
ad-valorem tariff regime tH which is too restrictive. The import
equivalent t should be less than tH to generate higher imports and
therefore qxs = qxtH < qxt .
There are more varieties under a specific tariff restriction than
an ad-valorem tariff. Ns = L(α−c)−2γ qds










t ,Ns is greater than Nt . 
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